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    吴帆, 郑臻哲. 基于博弈论的频谱动态管理研究[J]. 计算机研究与发展, 2016, 53(1): 38-52. DOI: 10.7544/issn1000-1239.2016.20150652
    引用本文: 吴帆, 郑臻哲. 基于博弈论的频谱动态管理研究[J]. 计算机研究与发展, 2016, 53(1): 38-52. DOI: 10.7544/issn1000-1239.2016.20150652
    Wu Fan, Zheng Zhenzhe. Game Theory Based Spectrum Dynamic Management[J]. Journal of Computer Research and Development, 2016, 53(1): 38-52. DOI: 10.7544/issn1000-1239.2016.20150652
    Citation: Wu Fan, Zheng Zhenzhe. Game Theory Based Spectrum Dynamic Management[J]. Journal of Computer Research and Development, 2016, 53(1): 38-52. DOI: 10.7544/issn1000-1239.2016.20150652

    基于博弈论的频谱动态管理研究

    Game Theory Based Spectrum Dynamic Management

    • 摘要: 随着无线通信技术的快速发展,无线频谱成为越来越紧缺的网络资源.现有的静态频谱管理机制导致频谱资源在空间维度和时间维度上的低利用率.拍卖机制被认为是解决频谱资源稀缺问题的行之有效的方法.然而,设计高效、实际的频谱拍卖机制需要考虑5个挑战:理性用户自私策略行为、信道异质特性、信道空间重用特性、用户偏好多样性和社会福利的最大化.对频谱拍卖机制的研究现状做了全面的综述,指出现有工作存在的问题,并提出可行的解决方案;展示了在异质频谱管理中的最新研究成果;将异质频谱的重分配问题建模成组合拍卖模型,结合5个设计难题提出高效的信道分配机制和定价策略.该机制实现了防策略性和近似社会福利最大化.

       

      Abstract: With the growing deployment of wireless communication technologies, radio spectrum is becoming a scarce resource. The current static spectrum management leads to low spectrum utilization in the spatial and temporal dimensions. Auction mechanism is believed to be an effective method among the most effective tools to solve or relieve the problem of radio spectrum shortage. However, designing a practical spectrum auction mechanism has to consider five major challenges: strategic behaviors of rational users, channel heterogeneity, channel spatial reusability, preference diversity and social welfare maximization. In this paper, we give a though literature survey about spectrum auction mechanism design, and point out the disadvantage of the existing works. We also present our recent work in heterogeneous spectrum management. We model the problem of heterogeneous spectrum allocation as a combinatorial auction. By jointly considering the five design challenges, we propose an efficient channel allocation mechanism and a price calculation scheme. We also prove that the proposed mechanism satisfies the strategy-proofness, and achieves approximately efficient social welfare.

       

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