高级检索
    桂劲松 吴 敏. 基于信任和服务预测的无线接入服务博弈控制方案[J]. 计算机研究与发展, 2012, 49(2): 231-242.
    引用本文: 桂劲松 吴 敏. 基于信任和服务预测的无线接入服务博弈控制方案[J]. 计算机研究与发展, 2012, 49(2): 231-242.
    Gui Jinsong and Wu Min. A Game Control Scheme Based on Prediction of Trust and Service for Wireless Access Service[J]. Journal of Computer Research and Development, 2012, 49(2): 231-242.
    Citation: Gui Jinsong and Wu Min. A Game Control Scheme Based on Prediction of Trust and Service for Wireless Access Service[J]. Journal of Computer Research and Development, 2012, 49(2): 231-242.

    基于信任和服务预测的无线接入服务博弈控制方案

    A Game Control Scheme Based on Prediction of Trust and Service for Wireless Access Service

    • 摘要: 自私的移动节点不仅不会无偿为其他节点转发分组,而且有多占系统资源的动机.为此,提出了一种移动节点与无线接入点之间的接入服务博弈控制方案.方案基于已有移动节点的行为信任等级、请求服务所需的资源要求,预测其未来一定属性组合条件下各个信任和请求服务等级的概率,并结合博弈分析给出了无线接入点接纳移动节点的概率和接纳控制的决策条件.一旦收到某移动节点的接入服务请求,并根据接纳概率,若无线接入点决定处理它,则基于贝叶斯网络模型预测其信任和请求服务等级的未来值.基于预测值、接纳概率、移动节点的欺骗概率,无线接入点判断是否响应其接入服务请求.应用示例与仿真分析表明,方案对移动节点具有良好的激励作用和较强的服务响应能力,而且博弈消息代价比现有相关方案小.

       

      Abstract: Selfish mobile nodes not only do not forward other nodes’ packets without payoff, but also have an incentive to occupy more system resources. Therefore, a game control scheme based on prediction of trust and requested service is proposed in this paper. The future levels for trust and requested service under the given attribute conditions are predicted in the scheme based on the current trust grade and service level. Based on the above, acceptance probability and decision-making condition are presented. Upon receiving a request from a mobile node, if a wireless access point decides to deal with it based on the acceptance probability, the mobile node’s future levels of trust and requested service are predicted by using Bayesian network model. By using the predicted values, the acceptance probability, and the mobile node’s cheat probability that is calculated by the system according to history records of the client’s paying for access services, the wireless access point makes a decision whether to respond the mobile node’s request or reject it. The exhibited example and the simulation results show that the scheme has the favorable incentive effect and service response capacity to clients, and its game cost is smaller than that of the existing works.

       

    /

    返回文章
    返回