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    蒋庆丰, 门朝光, 李香, 何忠政. 基于虚拟货币的DTNs激励感知低时延路由[J]. 计算机研究与发展, 2015, 52(12): 2707-2724. DOI: 10.7544/issn1000-1239.2015.20140566
    引用本文: 蒋庆丰, 门朝光, 李香, 何忠政. 基于虚拟货币的DTNs激励感知低时延路由[J]. 计算机研究与发展, 2015, 52(12): 2707-2724. DOI: 10.7544/issn1000-1239.2015.20140566
    Jiang Qingfeng, Men Chaoguang, Li Xiang, He Zhongzheng. A Virtual Currency-Based Incentive-Aware Low Delay Routing for DTNs[J]. Journal of Computer Research and Development, 2015, 52(12): 2707-2724. DOI: 10.7544/issn1000-1239.2015.20140566
    Citation: Jiang Qingfeng, Men Chaoguang, Li Xiang, He Zhongzheng. A Virtual Currency-Based Incentive-Aware Low Delay Routing for DTNs[J]. Journal of Computer Research and Development, 2015, 52(12): 2707-2724. DOI: 10.7544/issn1000-1239.2015.20140566

    基于虚拟货币的DTNs激励感知低时延路由

    A Virtual Currency-Based Incentive-Aware Low Delay Routing for DTNs

    • 摘要: 由于带宽、缓存、能量等资源有限,延迟容忍网络(delay tolerant networks, DTNs)节点会具有一定的自私性.为节省宝贵的资源,自私节点会拒绝转发其他节点的消息,从而严重影响路由性能.为激励DTNs自私节点合作转发,减小消息传递时延,提出一种基于虚拟货币的激励感知低时延路由(virtual currency-based incentive-aware low delay routing, VCILDR).该路由通过建立基于时延的货币支付和分配策略,促使自私节点快速转发其他节点消息,将直接互利消息转发给传递时延小的节点,并交换可交换互利消息.建立轮流出价讨价还价博弈模型,以确定路由中节点的可交换互利消息,并提出一种求解该模型子博弈完美均衡的贪婪算法.在真实数据集上对该激励感知低时延路由的性能进行仿真验证.实验结果表明,该路由能够有效激励DTNs自私节点进行合作转发,减小消息传递时延,同时提高消息传递成功率.

       

      Abstract: Due to the limited resources such as bandwidth, buffer, energy, and so on, most delay tolerant networks (DTNs) nodes are selfish and do not forward messages for other nodes to save their precious resources, which seriously degrades the routing performance. To stimulate the DTNs selfish nodes to cooperatively forward messages and reduce the message delivery delay, this paper proposes a virtual currency-based incentive-aware low delay routing algorithm, called VCILDR. A delay-based currency payment and allocation strategy is established to encourage selfish nodes to forward messages for other nodes in VCILDR. In this way, the direct beneficial messages are forwarded to the nodes with lower delivery delay and mutually beneficial messages are exchanged at the same time. A bargaining game model of alternating offers is established to determine the exchanged mutually beneficial messages. In addition, a greedy algorithm for solving the model’s subgame perfect equilibrium is proposed in this paper. Extensive simulations are carried out on real-world dataset to verify the performance of this incentive-aware low delay routing. The experimental results show that the proposed routing can effectively stimulate DTNs selfish nodes to cooperatively forward messages for others, reduce the message delivery delay and improve the message delivery success ratio at the same time.

       

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