ISSN 1000-1239 CN 11-1777/TP

Journal of Computer Research and Development ›› 2019, Vol. 56 ›› Issue (10): 2216-2228.doi: 10.7544/issn1000-1239.2019.20190406

Special Issue: 2019密码学与智能安全研究专题

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Ciphertext-Only Fault Analysis of the MIBS Lightweight Cryptosystem in the Internet of Things

Li Wei1,2,3,4, Cao Shan1, Gu Dawu2, Li Jiayao1, Wang Menglin1, Cai Tianpei1, Shi Xiujin1   

  1. 1(School of Computer Science and Technology, Donghua University, Shanghai 201620);2(Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240);3(Shanghai Key Laboratory of Scalable Computing and Systems (Shanghai Jiao Tong University), Shanghai 200240);4(Shanghai Key Laboratory of Integrate Administration Technologies for Information Security (Shanghai Jiao Tong University), Shanghai 200240)
  • Online:2019-10-16

Abstract: The lightweight cryptosystem MIBS was proposed at the CANS conference in 2009. It has high efficiency in both hardware implementation and software implementation. MIBS can resist against classical cryptanalysis, such as differential analysis and linear analysis, etc. It is suitable for the resource-limited devices in the Internet of things. This paper proposes new ciphertext-only fault analysis of the MIBS cryptosystem. The attackers can apply a new fault model of Double AND and two novel distinguishers of Parzen-HW and Parzen-HW-MLE to break MIBS. The experiments only require at least 72 fault injections to recover the secret key with a success probability of no less than 99%. The method can further reduce fault injections and time, and effectively improve the attacking efficiency. It shows that the ciphertext-only fault analysis poses a serious threaten to the security of MIBS. The research also provides an important reference for the security analysis of other lightweight cryptosystems.

Key words: lightweight cryptosystem, MIBS, ciphertext-only fault analysis, Internet of things, distinguisher

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