摘要:
在后量子数字签名方案中，基于哈希函数的签名方案是高效和可证明安全的.然而，过长的密钥和签名是基于哈希函数的签名方案最主要的问题.在已有签名方案的基础上，提出一个新的一次签名方案，该方案不仅减少了签名的数量，同时减少了每个签名的长度.和Winternitz OTS方案相比，新的方案在密钥和签名尺寸上分别减少了77%和82%，和WOTS+方案相比，在密钥和签名尺寸上分别减少了60.7%和60.5%.在签名长度上，新方案与近2年提出的NOTS,SDS-OTS和WOTS-S方案相比，分别减少了17%，24.5%和48.1%.另外，证明了新的方案在选择明文攻击(Chosen-Plaintext Attack, CPA)下是存在不可伪造的，安全性可规约为底层哈希函数的单向性.除此之外，实验证实了与WOTS+方案相比，在密钥生成、签名生成和签名验证所需时间上，新的方案分别减少了71.4%,47.7%和60.9%.
Abstract:
In the post-quantum digital signature schemes, the Hash-based signature schemes are efficient and provably secure. However, one major drawback of Hash-based signature schemes is the large size of the key and the signature. In this study, based on existing digital signature schemes, a new One-Time Signature (OTS) scheme, which reduces both the number of the signatures and the size of each signature, has been proposed. Under the same post-quantum security level, the proposed scheme reduces the key and the signature sizes by 77% and 82.0% respectively as compared with the Winternitz OTS scheme. And it also reduces the key and the signature sizes by 60.7% and 60.5% respectively as compared with WOTS+. In terms of the signature size, compared with the NOTS, SDS-OTS and WOTS-S schemes proposed in the past two years, this proposed novel scheme has reduced by 17%, 24.5% and 48.1% respectively. Furthermore, this novel scheme is existentially unforgeable under the Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA) model. The security of this scheme is a security reduction of the onewayness of the underlying Hash function. Moreover, compared with WOTS+, the proposed signature scheme reduces the time of generating keys, creating signatures and verifying signatures by 71.4%, 47.7%, and 60.9% respectively.
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