高级检索

    Ad Hoc网络中基于惩罚机制的激励合作转发模型

    An Incentive-Cooperative Forwarding Model Based on Punishment Mechanism in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks

    • 摘要: 由于Ad hoc网络中的节点受到自身处理能力、存储空间和电池能量等各种资源的限制,节点为了节省自身的宝贵资源经常会表现出自私性,因此激励自私节点之间合作转发成为Ad hoc网络重要的研究内容.为此,结合重复博弈理论的思想,首先建立邻居节点之间的单阶段博弈模型,得到对应的支付策略,并对该模型进行延伸,建立了无限重复博弈模型来增强自私节点的合作行为,提出了3种激励自私节点的惩罚策略,分析了各自激励合作转发的条件.对自私节点的通用惩罚机制进行重点分析.最后通过仿真实验对该机制进行验证,并给出了在激励合作博弈中自私节点效用值的演化过程.仿真结果表明:该机制能够有效地激励节点合作转发的积极性,提高网络的吞吐量,延长网络的生存时间,以及增加网络的总预期收益.

       

      Abstract: Due to the limited processing ability, storage and energy of mobile nodes in wireless Ad hoc networks, nodes always conserve their scare resources to show the selfish behavior. So stimulating the cooperation behaviors among nodes to actively forward packets is becoming an important research topic. According to the idea of classic game theory, this paper firstly proposes a one-step game model to analyze the payoff matrix between neighbor nodes, and extends the model to an infinite-repeated game on cooperated forwarding packets to enhance the collaboration behavior, and illustrates three punishment strategies towards behaviors of selfish nodes (one-step punishment strategy, severe punishment strategy and a general punishment strategy), and then derives the corresponding incentive cooperation forwarding conditions. Nevertheless, in this paper, we focus on the general punishment mechanism for consideration. Finally, to verify the correctness and effectiveness of the scheme and mechanism mentioned above, this paper implements this scheme and compares its performance with classic AODV protocol by using NS2, Moreover, displays the incentive-cooperative executing process of different utilities of selfish nodes during the simulation time. Simulation results show that this scheme can enhance cooperation effectively, improve throughput among the nodes, prolong the lifetime of the network and increase the expected total payoff of all nodes.

       

    /

    返回文章
    返回