A Strategic Negotiation Model of Incomplete Information Under Time Constraints

As far as the architecture of one to one negotiation for practical use is concerned, the strategies of a negotiation agent should satisfy the requirements of equilibrium and rationality when it faces the pressure of its deadline as well as the uncertainties about the types and the deadlines of its opponents In this paper, a strategic model for negotiation of alternative offers with a formal game theory is presented, a definition of equilibrium combination for negotiation of alternative offers is given, equilibrium strategies based on an incomplete information negotiation under time constraints are provided, and a practicable negotiation algorithm based on the equilibrium strategies is constructed Finally, the experiment data generated by the algorithm are analyzed In contrast to the agents based on the negotiation model of Zeus, negotiation agents, which follow the strategies of equilibrium combination in the model, can dynamically take actions according to the beliefs of uncertain information of the opponent agent to obtain the maximum expected utilities