An Ascending Bid Multi-Attribute Auction Method

Use auction methods to allocate resources among self-interested agents efficiently and reasonably is one of the challenges of multi-agent systems. Multi-attribute auctions extend traditional auction settings to allow negotiation over non-price attributes such as weight, color, size in addition to price. Based on a generalized multi-attribute auction model, an auction method—MAE is provided. MAE is an extension for English auction from single attribute to multi-attribute. Strategies and profits of buyer and sellers in MAE. Some main properties of MAE are proved. Buyers and sellers are individually rational in MAE. Buyers and sellers have nearly optimal strategies. The total profit of buyers and sellers is nearly optimal with the given strategies. Compared with Esther David's works, MAE has a more generalized model. Compared with the MAV auction, MAE is more transparent for sellers. Seller's strategy in MAE is more intuitive than in MAV.