Trusted Execution Environment: State-of-the-Art and Future Directions

Zhang Fengwei; Zhou Lei; Zhang Yiming; Ren Mingde; Deng Yunjie

doi:10.7544/issn1000-1239.202221016

Journal of Computer Research and Development > 2024 > 61(1): 243-260. > DOI: 10.7544/issn1000-1239.202221016

Zhang Fengwei, Zhou Lei, Zhang Yiming, Ren Mingde, Deng Yunjie. Trusted Execution Environment: State-of-the-Art and Future Directions[J]. Journal of Computer Research and Development, 2024, 61(1): 243-260. DOI: 10.7544/issn1000-1239.202221016

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Trusted Execution Environment: State-of-the-Art and Future Directions

Research Institute of Trustworthy Autonomous Systems, Southern University of Science and Technology, Shenzhen, Guangdong 518055
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Southern University of Science and Technology, Shenzhen, Guangdong 518055

Funds: This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (62372218, 62002151) and the Shenzhen Science and Technology Program (SGDX20201103095408029).

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Author Bio:
Zhang Fengwei: born in 1986. PhD, professor, PhD supervisor. Senior member of CCF. His main research interests include system security, hardware assisted security, trusted execution environment, transparent tracing, and debugging technology

Zhou Lei: born in 1988. PhD. His main research interests include x86-based system security and trusted computing technology

Zhang Yiming: born in 1994. PhD candidate. His main research interests include Arm architecture confidential computing and hardware assisted security system

Ren Mingde: born in 1999. PhD candidate. His main research interests include RISC-V architecture system security and confidential computing technology

Deng Yunjie: born in 1998. Master. His main research interests include Arm architecture system security and confidential computing technology
Received Date: December 15, 2022
Revised Date: May 29, 2023
Available Online: September 20, 2023

Graphical Abstract

Abstract

Abstract

Trusted execution environment (TEE) technologies are widely developed in the current computer systems along with the user’s serious concerns about privacy protection, secure computing, etc. in network services. Generally, TEEs provide an isolated execution environment for the managers and users for privacy and confidential computing even if the underlying operating systems are compromised. To build the TEEs, the device manufacturers like Intel, Arm update the hardware foundation by adding the external processor mode, memory control, cryptography engine, etc. In addition, they provide corresponding interfaces in the system following the application requirements. Except that, researchers further design compatible TEE models for various goals with the above hardware or firmware assistance. We comprehensively analyze the technical characteristics of TEE technology in mainstream system architecture (including x86, Arm, RISC-V, heterogeneous computing unit), including infrastructure and hardware facilities design, software interface definition, security boundary, etc., and explore the feasible application scenarios of TEE technology. At the same time, we analyze the challenges of current TEE technologies and discuss the limitations and the security risks, e.g., side-channel attacks. Finally, we summarize the advantages and disadvantages of various TEE technologies from the aspects of security and functionality, and consider the future development of TEE.
- trusted execution environment (TEE),
- OS architecture,
- memory isolation,
- processor mode,
- security attestation

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References (122)

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