Survey of Transient Execution Attacks

Li Yang; Ma Ziqiang; Lin Jingqiang; Meng Lingjia; Li Bingyu; Miao Li; Gao Fei

doi:10.7544/issn1000-1239.202440167

Journal of Computer Research and Development > 2024 > Accepted Manuscript > DOI: 10.7544/issn1000-1239.202440167

Li Yang, Ma Ziqiang, Lin Jingqiang, Meng Lingjia, Li Bingyu, Miao Li, Gao Fei. Survey of Transient Execution Attacks[J]. Journal of Computer Research and Development. DOI: 10.7544/issn1000-1239.202440167

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Survey of Transient Execution Attacks

Li Yang^{1, 5,},
Ma Ziqiang^{1, 5, ,},
Lin Jingqiang^2,,
Meng Lingjia^4,,
Li Bingyu^3,,
Miao Li^{1, 5,},
Gao Fei^{1, 5,}

1.
School of Information Engineering, Ningxia University, Yinchuan 750021
2.
School of Cyber Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026
3.
School of Cyber Science and Technology, Beihang University, Beijing 100191
4.
Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense(Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences), Beijing 100085
5.
Ningxia Key Laboratory of Artificial Intelligence and Information Security for Channeling Computing Resources from the East to the West(Ningxia University), Yinchuan 750021

Funds: This work was supported by the Natural Science Foundation of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region of China (2021AAC03078), the Key Research and Development Program of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (2021BEB04004, 2021BEB04047, 2022BDE03008), and the Graduate Science and Technology Innovation Foundation of Ningxia University (CXXM2023-20).

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Author Bio:
Li Yang: born in 1999. M.S. candidate. Student member of CCF. His main research interests include computer system security and information security

Ma Ziqiang: born in 1990. PhD, associate professor. Member of CCF. His main research interests include Computer system security, blockchain application security, network traffic identification

Lin Jingqiang: born in 1978. PhD, professor. Member of CCF. His main research interests include applied cryptography, network security and system security.（linjq@ustc.edu.cn）

Meng Lingjia: born in 1996. PhD candidate. Student member of CCF. His main research interests include system security and applied cryptography.（menglingjia@iie.ac.cn）

Li Bingyu: born in 1990. PhD, associate professor. Member of CCF. His main research interests include cryptographic application security, network security.（libingyu@buaa.edu.cn）

Miao Li: born in 1986. PhD, associate professor. Member of CCF. Her main research interests include cyberspace security, information security.（limiao_smile@nxu.edu.cn）

Gao Fei: born in 1995. M.S candidate. Student member of CCF. Her main research interests include system security and information security.（gaofei@stu.nxu.edu.cn）
Received Date: March 11, 2024
Revised Date: September 18, 2024
Accepted Date: October 14, 2024
Available Online: October 20, 2024

Graphical Abstract

Abstract

Abstract

Transient execution attacks (TEAs) exploit processor optimizations to bypass security checks and exfiltrate sensitive information through covert channels. Among them, Meltdown and Spectre attacks have become prominent, affecting mainstream commercial processors such as Intel, ARM, and AMD. Despite the defensive measures implemented by processor manufacturers, variants of these attacks continue to be discovered and disclosed by researchers. To improve the understanding of TEAs and deploy robust defenses, this paper comprehensively analyzes TEAs under various covert channels. Initially, the common characteristics of TEAs are extracted, and a novel model for TEAs is systematically constructed. Subsequently, we summarize the various types of covert channels involved in existing research, classify the TEAs into three types: Meltdown type attacks driven by out-of-order execution (OoOE), Spectre type attacks driven by branch misprediction, and microarchitecture data sampling (MDS) type attacks driven by data misprediction, and delineate the key aspects and relationships of each type of attack. Notably, this paper systematically compiles and categorizes MDS type attacks for the first time. Then, the capabilities of each attack variant were meticulously analyzed and evaluated from three dimensions: covert channel, attack applicable scenarios, and microarchitecture immunity status, which aids security researchers in developing new, more destructive attack types based on the deficiencies of the existing attack-related research. Finally, combined with the above-mentioned comprehensive and in-depth analysis and summary of processor microarchitecture and covert channels, this paper anticipates the future trajectory of TEAs research, hoping to provide strong support for subsequent research work.
- convert channel,
- transient execution attack,
- side-channel attacks,
- microarchitecture data sampling attack,
- cache side channel,
- system security

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References (147)

References

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